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I. INTRODUCTION
Trinity Lutheran Church operates a daycare in Columbia, Mis-
souri.1 The daycare includes a playground used by children in the day-
care and other children in the community.2 Coarse pea gravel covers
most of the playground.3 When children fall on the playground, the
“unforgiving” gravel scrapes their knees.4
To make the playground safe for all children and accessible for
children with disabilities, Trinity Lutheran applied for a grant with
the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (the Department) in
2012.5 The Department runs a resurfacing grant program, which en-
ables schools and daycares to obtain softer, safer surfaces for play-
grounds by reimbursing purchases of recycled-tire surfacing.6 The
grant program is competitive because the state does not have unlim-
ited resources.7 The Department ranks applicants and distributes
funds to those ranking highest.8
In 2012, forty-four playgrounds applied, and the Department is-
sued fourteen grants.9 Fortunately for Trinity Lutheran, it scored
among the highest applicants, ranking fifth.10 Unfortunately for Trin-
ity Lutheran and the children in its neighborhood, the Department
still denied its application.11
The Department denied Trinity Lutheran because it is a church.12
The Department cited Article I, Section 7 of Missouri’s constitution,
which forbids the state from funding religious organizations.13 Trinity
Lutheran sued, claiming the state violated the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment by categorically excluding churches from a pub-
1. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017
(2017).
2. Id. at 2017–18.
3. Id. at 2017.
4. Id. at 2017, 2025.
5. Id. at 2017–18.
6. Id. at 2017.
7. Id.
8. Id. The Department ranks an applicant using criteria including the poverty of its
neighborhood and its plan to promote recycling. Id.
9. Id. at 2018.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577).
13. Brief of Respondent at 1, Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577). The text
of that section reads:
[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indi-
rectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination of religion, or in aid of
any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no
preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any
church, sect, or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or
worship.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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lic benefit program.14 A district court granted summary judgment for
the Department.15
This Note focuses on Trinity Lutheran’s case. Part II traces the
case’s appellate history. Part II also summarizes how the Court has
treated the religion clauses of the U.S. Constitution and how those
clauses interact with each other. Part III argues the Supreme Court
correctly held that Missouri’s policy violated the Free Exercise Clause
but contends that one aspect of the Court’s reasoning—how it distin-
guishes between religious status and religious use—is unsound and
should be abandoned. Part III also identifies two areas of current liti-
gation affected by Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer. Part IV de-
scribes how lower courts have reacted to Trinity Lutheran, questions
the immediate impact of the case, and forecasts future Supreme Court
action.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Religion Clauses
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause (the relig-
ion clauses) of the Constitution read: “Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”16 The religion clauses complement one another in their goal
of protecting “freedom of religious belief and actions”17 but achieve
this goal in different ways. The Establishment Clause restrains gov-
ernment from specially “support[ing]” religion,18 while the Free Exer-
cise Clause restrains government from “impos[ing] special disabilities”
on religion.19
Because government efforts to avoid improperly supporting relig-
ion may be construed as imposing special disabilities on religion and
government efforts to avoid improperly disabling religion may be con-
strued as supporting religion, the Court has observed that the religion
clauses “tend to clash” with each other when “expanded to a logical
extreme.”20 Given this tendency to clash, the Court has refused to ex-
14. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2018.
15. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140
(W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub
nom., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1248 (5th
ed. 2015).
18. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
19. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993).
20. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668–69; see also Mark C. Rahdert, A Jurisprudence of Hope:
Justice Blackmun and the Freedom of Religion, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 19–20
(1998) (outlining one Justice’s approach to the “competing demands of the two
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pand the clauses to their extremes. Instead, it has recognized that
there is “room for play in the joints [between the religion clauses] pro-
ductive of a benevolent neutrality” so long as the government action is
not “expressly proscribed” by either of the religion clauses.21
So, under the “play in the joints doctrine,” governments may mildly
favor religion to avoid strongly disfavoring it and may mildly disfavor
religion to avoid strongly favoring it. For instance, a public school may
release religious students from class to receive religious instruction
without marking them truant, even though that release would be in-
compatible with an Establishment Clause pressed to the “extremes,”
because doing so serves Free Exercise interests by accommodating re-
ligion.22 In the other direction, a state may prohibit students from us-
ing scholarship funds to train for the ministry—even though that
prohibition would be incompatible with a Free Exercise Clause
pressed to the extremes—because doing so serves Establishment in-
terests by preventing the government from sponsoring clergy.23 Trin-
ity Lutheran involves a state’s effort to protect an Establishment
Clause interest—avoiding state funding of churches24—and that ef-
fort’s effect on a Free Exercise Clause interest—fully including relig-
ious persons in public benefit programs.25
On the Establishment interest in Trinity Lutheran, the Court has
often evaluated the constitutionality of government funding of institu-
tions owned by churches. In doing so, it has assessed funding differ-
ently based on context. Cases involving funding of parochial schools
are “numerous” and “difficult to reconcile.”26 Meanwhile, cases involv-
ing funding of other religiously affiliated institutions are few and
marked by deference.27
In Bradfield v. Roberts, the Court upheld a federal program that
paid church-controlled hospitals to care for the poor.28 The Court
found church ownership “wholly immaterial” to the hospital’s eligibil-
ity for federal funds.29 In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court upheld a com-
petitive grant that funded institutions to solve problems of adolescent
sexuality, even though many of the eventual grantees were religious
clauses”). But see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Re-
straint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1998) (attributing the
“imagined ‘tension’” between the two clauses to the “rights-based” approach to
the Establishment Clause).
21. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
22. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312–15 (1952).
23. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–23 (2004).
24. Brief of Respondent, supra note 13, at 3.
25. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–22
(2017).
26. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 1296.
27. See id. at 1313–15.
28. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 1313 (quoting Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 298).
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organizations.30 The Bowen Court applied the Lemon test.31 It decided
that the grant had a secular purpose—solving problems of adolescent
sexuality—and that the government did not vitiate this secular pur-
pose by including churches.32 The Court also found that the program
did not impermissibly advance religion because the government
funded religious and nonreligious charitable organizations on a neu-
tral basis without reference to religion.33 In his opinion for the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the Establishment Clause
did not justify expunging religious organizations from public benefit
programs.34
As for the Free Exercise interest in Trinity Lutheran, the Court
has repeatedly held that the government cannot discriminate against
religious people when distributing public benefits. The seminal case is
Sherbert v. Verner,35 where a Seventh-day Adventist lost her job for
refusing to work on Saturday. South Carolina denied her unemploy-
ment benefits after determining she had refused work without good
cause.36 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan explained that the
“disqualification for benefits” deriving “solely from the practice of her
religion” created an impermissible “burden on . . . free exercise” be-
cause it placed “unmistakable” pressure on her to forgo that prac-
tice.37 Although Sherbert was construed narrowly in Employment
Division v. Smith,38 since Smith the Court has cited Sherbert and its
progeny39 for the proposition that governments may not discriminate
in the distribution of benefits in a way that puts citizens to a choice
“between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”40
30. 487 U.S. 589, 593–97 (1988).
31. Id. at 602. The Lemon test is one approach to Establishment Clause analysis, and
it involves a three-pronged inquiry. Under the Lemon test, a government action is
invalid if it lacks a secular purpose, if its primary effect is to advance religion, or
if it creates excessive entanglement with religion. Id. The Lemon test’s future is
uncertain because today’s conservative Justices disfavor the test. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 17, at 1273.
32. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602–04.
33. Id. at 605–12.
34. Id. at 608–10.
35. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Sword or Shield: Use of
Tithing to Establish Nondischargeability of Debt Following Enactment of the Re-
ligious Liberties and Charitable Donation Protection Act, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 471, 472–74 (2011) (tracing the line of cases that started with Sherbert).
36. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–402.
37. Id. at 403–04.
38. 494 U.S. 872, 882–85 (1990). Smith rejected Sherbert’s compelling interest test
for neutral laws that indirectly burden religious activity. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–61 (2014); see also Radwan, supra note 35, at
474–75 (explaining Smith’s treatment of Sherbert).
39. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
40. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004).
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Thus, the Court has allowed governments to fund religious organiza-
tions when they have done so in a way that is neutral to religion and
has prohibited governments from discriminating against religion with
public benefits.
B. Appellate Opinion
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Trinity
Lutheran’s suit.41 The Eighth Circuit described Trinity Lutheran’s
claims as “plainly facial attacks on Article I, § 7, of the Missouri Con-
stitution”42 and held that the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann43 precluded the court of appeals from find-
ing Section 7 facially invalid.44
In Luetkemeyer, plaintiffs challenged Missouri’s policy of busing
children to public schools but not parochial schools.45 A district court
upheld Missouri’s bus policy.46 The court identified the case as falling
in the play of the joints between the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.47 It noted that while Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation48 and the Establishment Clause did not forbid busing students
to parochial schools, Sherbert and the Free Exercise Clause did not
require busing either.49 Sherbert involved only the right to participate
in benefit programs offered to the public, not the right to demand new
programs uniquely benefiting religious organizations.50 In any case,
Missouri had a compelling interest in upholding the separation of
church and state demanded by its constitution, even though its Article
1, Section 7 went beyond the federal Establishment Clause.51
However, the Eighth Circuit noted that the Court’s understanding
of the Establishment Clause has “evolved rather dramatically” since
Luetkemeyer and compared Trinity Lutheran’s case to the more recent
Locke v. Davey.52 In Locke, the Supreme Court upheld Washington’s
41. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir.
2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.
v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
42. Trinity Lutheran, 788 F.3d at 783.
43. 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff’d, 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
44. Trinity Lutheran, 788 F.3d at 783–84.
45. Luetkemeyer, 364 F. Supp. at 378–79.
46. Id. at 387.
47. Id. at 386.
48. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For a summary of Everson in the context of Trinity Lutheran,
see Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government Dollars—and
Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 137–38 (2017).
49. Luetkemeyer, 364 F. Supp. at 381, 385.
50. Id. at 385.
51. Id. at 386.
52. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 784–85 (8th
Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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Promise Scholarship Program (the Program).53 The Program provided
scholarships to high-performing students in need of financial aid, but
it prevented the students from using the scholarships to pursue a de-
gree in “devotional theology.”54 Davey earned a scholarship, but
Washington did not allow him to use it because he was pursuing a
devotional theology degree to become a minister.55 Thus, he argued
the Program violated the Free Exercise Clause.56
The Court found the Program to be at the core of the play in the
joints doctrine.57 The Establishment Clause did not require Washing-
ton to exclude devotional theologians from the Program because the
student—not the state—ultimately chose where and how to spend the
scholarship.58 Even though the federal Establishment Clause allowed
the payments, the Court recognized the refusal to fund the training of
ministers as a “historic and substantial state interest” because of
Washington’s establishment history and its relevant state constitu-
tional provisions.59 The Court found the interest strong enough to jus-
tify excluding devotional theologians against a Free Exercise claim
because the Program’s restrictions placed only a light burden on free
exercise: recipients could still take classes in devotional theology60 or
use the scholarship to pursue a second degree,61 and the program
went “a long way toward including religion in its benefits” by allowing
recipients to attend “pervasively religious schools.”62
Returning to Trinity Lutheran’s case, the Eighth Circuit observed
that Missouri’s establishment interest may be even greater than that
vindicated in Locke because this case involved direct public funding of
a church, while the funding in Locke went to a religious institution
only through a chain-breaking private choice.63 The court of appeals
53. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
54. Id. at 715–17.
55. Id. at 717.
56. Brief for Respondent at 15, Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315).
57. Locke, 540 U.S. at 722.
58. Id. at 719. In previous cases, the Court sustained programs where the govern-
ment gave money to religious institutions when private citizens determined who
would receive the money instead of the government. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 650 (2002); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 487 (1986).
59. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725. Article I, section 11 of Washington’s constitution states,
“No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.”
Brief for Petitioners at 1, Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315). Washington adopted
this provision in 1889 (the year it became a state) to prevent government inva-
sion into matters of religious conscience. Id. at 2–3.
60. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
61. Id. at 721 n.4.
62. Id. at 724.
63. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 785 (8th Cir.
2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.
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concluded that the Court’s holding in Locke “reinforces our decision
that Luetkemeyer is controlling precedent foreclosing Trinity Church’s
facial attack on Article I, § 7, of the Missouri Constitution.”64 Having
found controlling and contradicting precedent from the Supreme
Court, the Eighth Circuit determined that granting relief to Trinity
Lutheran was beyond its authority and insisted that relief, if it were
to come at all, must come from the Supreme Court.65 In doing so, it
foreshadowed the Court’s eventual approach by referring to Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Locke, which asserted that a government violates
the Free Exercise Clause when it denies generally available public
benefits on the basis of religion.66
C. Supreme Court Opinions
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mis-
souri violated the Constitution when it excluded Trinity Lutheran’s
application.67 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s opinion (except
as to footnote 3).68 Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan joined Rob-
erts’s opinion in full, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined ex-
cept as to footnote 3.69
1. The Majority
The Court held that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit
Missouri from including Trinity Lutheran in the grant program and
that the Free Exercise Clause required Missouri to include Trinity Lu-
theran.70 Citing Locke and the agreement between the parties, the
Court began by announcing that Trinity Lutheran was not an Estab-
lishment Clause case—Missouri could have funded Trinity Lutheran’s
playground surface without violating the First Amendment—but a
Free Exercise Clause case.71 Thus, the Court asked whether the “play
in the joints” recognized in Walz and Locke was wide enough to permit
state discretion there or the Free Exercise Clause was broad enough to
proscribe that state action expressly.72
v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); see supra note 58. In Locke, the student directed
the state’s funds when he chose to attend Northwest College. Locke, 540 U.S. at
717.
64. Trinity Lutheran, 788 F.3d at 785.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 726–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
67. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016, 2019.
68. Id. at 2017. Footnote 3 reads: “This case involves express discrimination based on
religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address re-
ligious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.” Id. at 2024 n.3.
69. Id. at 2016.
70. Id. at 2019, 2024.
71. Id. at 2019.
72. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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The Court summarized the Free Exercise Clause as protecting “re-
ligious observers against unequal treatment” and “ ‘special disabilities’
based on their ‘religious status.’”73 The Court observed that it had ac-
cordingly applied strict scrutiny when a government denied a “gener-
ally available benefit” on the basis of religious status.74
The Court then reviewed its precedent in the area. The Court
started this review with Everson, which it cited for the proposition
that when a state denies the “benefits of public welfare legislation” to
some people on the basis of their religious status, it interferes with
their ability to exercise their religion freely and, therefore, violates the
Constitution.75 The Court moved on to McDaniel v. Paty—a case to
which it paid particular attention. McDaniel concerned a Tennessee
law that disqualified ministers from being delegates to the state’s con-
stitutional convention.76 McDaniel held that governments cannot dis-
criminate on religious status (there, “status as a minister”)77 even
when the discrimination is part of a “historical tradition.”78
The Court next showed that these principles had survived its re-
cent cases. It cited Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Asso-
ciation, which explained why a government may not deny benefits on
the basis of religious status: the government thereby “penalize[s] re-
ligious activity,” coercing religious adherents into violating their be-
liefs.79 The Court then looked at Smith and emphasized that even its
narrow understanding of the Free Exercise Clause did not permit
“special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious sta-
tus.”80 The Court concluded its review with Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah and pointed out that Lukumi too
forbade governments from imposing “special disabilities” on religion,
which includes denying the religious public benefits.81
After reviewing precedent, the Court applied the precedent to the
Department’s policy. It said:
The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible re-
cipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their
73. Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 533, 542 (1993)).
74. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628
(1978) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))).
75. Id. at 2019–20.
76. Id. at 2020.
77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627).
78. Id. at 2020.
79. Id. (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449
(1988)).
80. Id. at 2020–21 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. 618)).
81. Id. at 2021 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (quoting Smith, 494
U.S. at 877)).
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religious character. If the cases just described make one thing clear, it is that
such a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers
the most exacting scrutiny.82
The Court analogized Trinity Lutheran to McDaniel.83 Tennessee
forced McDaniel to choose between continuing to be a minister and
participating in a government program; Missouri forced Trinity Lu-
theran to choose between continuing to be a church and participating
in a government program.84 In both cases, the government unconsti-
tutionally put a condition on the exercise of constitutional rights by
excluding one who chooses to exercise those rights from a public
benefit.85
The Court next addressed the Department’s argument that Locke
should control. The Court distinguished Locke. First, the Court found
the scholarship program in Locke discriminated on religious use not
status.86 In other words, the scholarship funds were open to all appli-
cants, regardless of their religion, but could not be used in a particular
way: to train for the ministry.87 In Trinity Lutheran, the Department
excluded all churches, no matter how the churches planned to use the
funds.88
The Court also emphasized that the limitation on the scholarship
in Locke was so narrow that it did not force applicants to “ ‘choose be-
tween their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.’ ”89
Students could use the scholarship to attend religious schools and
even take devotional theology courses, so long as they did not use it to
pursue devotional theology degrees.90 In contrast, for Trinity Lu-
theran to obtain the government benefit, it would have to cease to be a
church.
The Court also noted the differences between Washington’s anti-
establishment interest in Locke and Missouri’s anti-establishment in-
terest in Trinity Lutheran. In Locke, the interest was to avoid state-
funded training of clergy.91 The Court considered this an especially
strong establishment interest because preparing to be a minister is
“akin to a religious calling” and this funding lies at the “historic core”
of the First Amendment.92 The Court could not say anything of the
82. Id. at 2021 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546).
83. Id. at 2021–22.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2022 (quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626).
86. Id. at 2023. I challenge this distinction in section III.C, infra.
87. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004).
88. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023–24.
89. Id. at 2023 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 720–21 (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. 618)).
90. Id. at 2023–24 (citing Locke, 540 U.S. at 721 n.4, 725).
91. Locke, 540 U.S. at 721 n.5.
92. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 721–22).
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sort about Missouri’s interest in preventing the use of public funds for
playground surfaces.93
Finally, the Court applied strict scrutiny after finding that Mis-
souri infringed on Free Exercise liberties. The Court found the policy
could not survive strict scrutiny because the government failed to
show an interest “of the highest order”94 where it only asserted Mis-
souri’s preference for “achieving greater separation of church and
State” than the federal Establishment Clause requires.95
2. The Concurrences
Justice Thomas concurred in part (he did not join footnote 3) and
Justice Gorsuch joined his opinion.96 Justice Thomas’s short concur-
rence focused more on Locke than on Trinity Lutheran. Thomas wrote
that Locke’s holding was inconsistent with the majority’s prohibition
against “denying a generally available benefit solely on account of re-
ligious identity.”97 He then summarized Locke’s holding and noted
that Locke’s failure to subject the scholarship policy to heightened
scrutiny “remains troubling.”98 He also explained that he only joined
the Court’s opinion because it had narrowly construed Locke to apply
just in the “limited context of support for ministerial training” and
because neither party had asked the Court to reconsider Locke.99 This
suggests that at least some Justices on the Court would be willing to
overturn Locke if an appropriate case arises and, in any case, that it
will be applied narrowly.
Justice Gorsuch also concurred in part (he did not join footnote 3),
and Justice Thomas joined his opinion. Gorsuch’s opinion “offer[ed]
only two modest qualifications.”100
First, he disagreed with the way the Court distinguished between
“religious status and religious use” to explain why Locke did not con-
trol.101 Gorsuch argued that the status–use distinction is unworkable
and inconsistent with the First Amendment. It is unworkable, he said,
because the distinction “blurs.”102 Since much of religious identity and
status involves religious activity and use, it will sometimes be impossi-
ble to determine whether discrimination targets use or status. To illus-
93. Id. at 2023.
94. Id. at 2024 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628).
95. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276
(1981)).
96. Id. at 2025.
97. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting majority
opinion).
98. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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trate this, he asked, “Does a religious man say grace before dinner? Or
does a man begin his meal in a religious manner?”103
The distinction is, he observed, also inconsistent with the text and
precedent of the First Amendment. He pointed out that the text of the
Free Exercise Clause protects “exercise of religion” and so should not
be interpreted to protect religious status only, while leaving religious
use unguarded.104 He also cited Lukumi for the proposition that the
Free Exercise Clause protects religious “practices.”105
Justice Gorsuch gave his second and related qualification: he could
not join footnote 3 of the Court’s opinion.106 Gorsuch admitted that
the footnote accurately described the case but expressed concern that
it would be “mistakenly” read to limit the scope of the decision.107 In
particular, he feared it might be read to apply only to “children’s
safety or health.”108 He stated that such a limitation would be inap-
propriate because the Court’s cases are “governed by general princi-
ples,”109 and the “general principles here do not permit discrimination
against religious exercise—whether on the playground or anywhere
else.”110
Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment
only (although he “agree[d] with much of what the Court sa[id]”).111
He emphasized the “particular nature” of the benefit from which Trin-
ity Lutheran was categorically excluded.112 He argued Missouri’s
“general program designed to secure or to improve the health and
safety of children” made the case analogous to Everson, which af-
firmed that the religion clauses do not prevent churches from receiv-
ing “general government services” like “police and fire protection.”113
He would have left the question of whether the religion clauses protect
other benefits “for another day.”114
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2026.
105. Id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 547 (1993)).
106. Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). See supra note 68 for the full text of
footnote 3.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 25 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment)).
110. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
111. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2027.
114. Id.
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3. The Dissent
Justice Sotomayor wrote a lengthy dissent, which Justice Ginsburg
joined.115 While reciting the facts, Justice Sotomayor emphasized the
proselytic nature of Trinity Lutheran’s daycare, which she said,
“ ‘teaches a Christian world view to children of members of the
Church, as well as children of non-member residents’ of the area.”116
Thus, Justice Sotomayor framed the question in the case as “whether
Missouri can decline to fund improvements to the facilities the Church
uses to practice and spread its religious views.”117
In Justice Sotomayor’s view, the Court’s precedent demanded Es-
tablishment Clause analysis because this case involved government
funding of a “house of worship.”118 In other words, while the majority
decided that this was not a play in the joints case because the Free
Exercise Clause requires Missouri to allow Trinity Lutheran to com-
pete for the grant, the dissent would have held that it was not a play
in the joints case because the Establishment Clause forbids Missouri
from making direct payments to Trinity Lutheran. In the dissent’s
view, the parties’ agreement on the Establishment Clause issue
should not have prevented the Court from considering it because
“[c]onstitutional questions are decided by this Court, not the parties’
concessions.”119
The dissent explained that if Missouri funded the playground im-
provements, it would violate the Establishment Clause because the
state would directly fund “religious exercise.”120 The dissent found
Trinity Lutheran to be “no different” from Tilton v. Richardson.121 In
that case, the Court found a federal grant unconstitutional because
the grant failed to prevent recipients from using the money to build
facilities that could eventually be used for religious purposes.122 When
the Court allowed direct funding of religious institutions, the dissent
wrote, it did so only when the funds would not be used for religious
activities, and since Trinity Lutheran used its daycare for religious
purposes, the funding should be impermissible.123
Moving on to the Free Exercise claim, the dissent defended the
play in the joints doctrine, which it found to be a necessary conse-
115. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app at 101a, Trinity Lutheran, 137 S.
Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577)).
117. Id. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2028–29 (citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1997); Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
121. Id. at 2029 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)).
123. Id. at 2030–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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quence of the conflicting demands of the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause.124 The dissent reasoned that a broad space
between the prohibitions of the religion clauses appropriately enables
state governments to accommodate the interests of each clause.125
This balancing sometimes allows governments to treat individuals
and institutions differently based on religious status—for instance, by
making churches exempt from taxation126 or immune to certain em-
ployment discrimination laws,127 or by refusing to fund training of the
clergy.128 Thus, the dissent accused the majority of breaking from the
Court’s precedent by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of relig-
ious status.
The dissent next, consistent with the Court’s precedent in the
area,129 examined the history of Missouri’s constitutional provision
that disallows public funding of churches.130 The dissent restated the
“powerful set of arguments” that led every state to end public funding
of churches.131 First, public funding of churches “risked divisiveness”
among different churches and different faiths by forcing them to com-
pete against each other for government resources.132 Next, sponsor-
ship weakened religion by making it more compulsory and less
voluntary.133 Public funding was also a step toward full
establishment.134
The dissent said, in light of the strong, historical anti-establish-
ment interest against funding churches, Locke should control and per-
mit the state to refuse to pay for Trinity Lutheran’s playground
surface.135 This invocation of Locke is not inconsistent with the dis-
sent’s stance on the Establishment issue—that, unlike in Locke, the
Establishment Clause forbids the grant—since in Locke, true private
choice broke the link between taxpayer funds and funded religious ac-
tivity, and this case lacks an analogous link-breaker.136 The dissent
124. Id. at 2031.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2032 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673–74 (1970)).
127. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987)).
128. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 (2004)).
129. See, e.g., Locke, 540 U.S. at 722–23; McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 621–26
(1978).
130. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2032 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2033; see infra section III.A.
132. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2033 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2033–35.
134. Id. at 2033–34 (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST
RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82
(P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987) (“[T]he same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment.”)).
135. Id. at 2035–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2035; see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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argued, however, that Locke was on point on the Free Exercise
claim.137 In Locke, the Court permitted differential treatment that
might have otherwise violated the Free Exercise Clause because of the
state’s “serious antiestablishment . . . interests” against funding min-
isterial training, which were rooted in the history of the religion
clauses.138 Likewise, the dissent said the Court should permit Mis-
souri to exclude churches from public funding programs given the seri-
ous, historically-rooted interests against directly funding houses of
worship.139 The dissent also emphasized the breadth of the decision’s
potential impact—thirty-eight states have provisions analogous to
Missouri’s constitutional amendment.140
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority’s rule as “out of step
with our precedents” and “wrong on its own terms.”141 The dissent
observed that a rule which prevents differential treatment based on
religious status is inconsistent with the religion clauses, which impose
special requirements on government action in the area of religion.142
It accused the majority of failing to address—and thus to reconcile—
Walz and Amos, cases where the Court allowed differential treat-
ment.143 The dissent also challenged the majority’s narrow construc-
tion of Locke. Rather than confine Locke to its facts, the dissent would
have upheld the principle behind Locke: a government “need
not . . . fund certain religious entities . . . where doing so raises ‘his-
toric and substantial’ establishment and free exercise concerns.”144
The dissent also pointed out that—in the area of religion—differential
treatment did not “amount to discrimination.”145 A rule that holds
otherwise, the dissent maintained, would render unconstitutional the
accommodations of religion the Court has upheld in the past because
the First Amendment protects both religion and non-religion, and—
under the majority’s understanding of discrimination—religious ex-
emptions, immunities, and accommodations would discriminate
against non-religion.146 The dissent argued that this skews precedent
in favor of religion by allowing differential treatment based on relig-
137. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2036–37.
138. Id. at 2036 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2036–38.
140. Id. at 2037. For a discussion of these provisions and of Trinity Lutheran’s impact
upon them, see Bronwyn Roantree, Challenging Statutory Accommodations for
Religiously Affiliated Daycares: An Application of the Third-Party-Harm Doc-
trine, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1393, 1421–22 (2017).
141. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2038 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2038–39.
144. Id. at 2039 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004)).
145. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2039–40.
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ious status when it benefits religion and disallowing it when it does
not benefit religion.147
The dissent also contested some of the majority’s factual character-
izations in the case. First, the dissent remarked that a refusal to fund
churches “does not disfavor religion” but reflects a decision to remain
secular: neutral between religion and atheism.148 Furthermore, in the
dissent’s view, the majority incorrectly characterized the grant as a
“generally available benefit” when it was only available to a few recip-
ients.149 Finally, even if strict scrutiny applied, the dissent would
have labeled the strong anti-establishment interest codified in the
laws of almost forty states as a compelling interest capable of surviv-
ing strict scrutiny.150
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Trinity Lutheran Is
Correct
The majority correctly held that Missouri violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause by denying Trinity Lutheran Church a generally available
public benefit solely on the basis of its status as a religious institution.
The Establishment Clause does not forbid the funding, and the Free
Exercise Clause requires it. Nevertheless, the dissent correctly sug-
gested that the Court ought to have addressed the Establishment
Clause issue.
The play in the joints doctrine is about the space between the Es-
tablishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. So, in potential
play in the joints cases, courts should draw the boundaries of each
clause when they explain why a government action falls within the
discretionary zone between the religion clauses or within a mandate of
one of the clauses. This is especially true in cases like Trinity Lu-
theran, where the Court applies strict scrutiny and the state offers an
anti-establishment interest. This is because the Court weighs the im-
portance of the anti-establishment interest against the federal Estab-
lishment Clause,151 which it cannot properly do without first
determining what the Establishment Clause says about the chal-
lenged policy.
If the Court did analyze the funding under the Establishment
Clause, the correct answer would have been to uphold the funding.
The most analogous case is Bowen.152 Both Bowen and Trinity Lu-
147. Id. at 2040.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2040–41.
151. See id. at 2024 (majority opinion).
152. Bowen is discussed in section II.A, supra.
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theran involved programs designed to deal with public concerns—ado-
lescent sexuality and pregnancy in Bowen, child safety and waste
disposal in Trinity Lutheran—and both pursued their goals by paying
institutions they deemed competent to help solve the problems.153
And each program allocated funds by having potential applicants ex-
plain how they could solve the public concerns targeted by the
programs.
In Bowen, the Court found that Congress could—without violating
the Establishment Clause—set up a system that ultimately funded
some religious organizations.154 The Court approved the arrange-
ment, even though this meant some secular organizations did not re-
ceive funds, because the recipients were selected through neutral
criteria that did not favor or advance religion.155 Thus, Missouri could
provide grants to religious institutions without violating the federal
Establishment Clause so long as it did so based on neutral criteria
that did not favor religion.156 Here, criteria included poverty in the
neighborhood and the promotion of recycling157—criteria which
neither reference nor favor religion. Because the Establishment
Clause is not “so strict as to require the blanket exclusion of churches
from generally available and entirely secular public benefits” and does
not “rule out cooperation between governments and religious institu-
tions in advancing safety, education, health, and social welfare,” the
Constitution permits Missouri to include churches in its grant
program.158
Moreover, the concern that Missouri’s program would functionally
fund the Church’s proselytic activity is resolved in Bowen, where the
Court addressed concerns that paying churches to teach about sex
would lead to government-funded teaching of religious dogma.159 The
Bowen Court reasoned that the coincidental overlapping of govern-
mental and religious purposes did not invalidate the program because
the government distributed the funding on a neutral basis across a
“wide spectrum” of organizations, just like Missouri’s grants.160
On the Free Exercise Claim, the majority’s reasoning is more per-
suasive than the dissent’s. It correctly construed Locke—a case which
153. Compare Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 606–07 (1988), with Trinity Lutheran,
137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), and Brief for Petitioner, supra note
12, at 1.
154. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593, 597.
155. Id. at 605–12.
156. See Laycock, supra note 48, at 147–48.
157. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
158. Richard W. Garnett, Consensus & Uncertainty at the Supreme Court, COMMON-
WEAL (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/consensus-uncertain
ty-supreme-court [https://perma.unl.edu/9FQL-VV4E].
159. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612–13.
160. Id. at 610.
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involved very strong establishment concerns and very weak free exer-
cise concerns—narrowly and applied the discrimination rules from
Lukumi and McDaniel instead.161 Although scholars have criticized
the Court’s discrimination framing,162 when a government discrimi-
nates on the basis of religion in the distribution of public benefits, it
pressures religious adherents and institutions to abandon their relig-
ious practices and beliefs, and this pressure is inimical to the free ex-
ercise guaranteed by the First Amendment.163
Although the historical arguments164 in Justice Sotomayor’s
“forceful and detailed”165 dissent should not be dismissed, they do not
apply in full force to the situation in Trinity Lutheran. The payment at
issue in Trinity Lutheran was materially different from those criti-
cized two hundred years ago, and the funding came in the context of a
starkly different government.
The historical enemies of establishment fought against laws which
funded “religion qua religion.”166 In other words, the laws “sin-
gled . . . out” churches and religious teachers for funding precisely be-
cause they were religious.167 Since the laws assigned a benefit
specifically to religious persons and for religious purposes, secular or-
ganizations, teachers, and aims did not likewise receive funding.168
For instance, the Virginia bill that James Madison condemned in his
“famous Memorial and Remonstrance”169 singled out Christians for
funding and, as its title, “A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers
of the Christian Religion,” suggests, had a religious purpose.170
Missouri did not single out religion for funding. Instead, the state
offered a “generally available public benefit.”171 It did not specifically
designate churches for a benefit nor did it extend a benefit only to, and
161. Richard W. Garnett & Jackson C. Blais, Religious Freedom and Recycled Tires:
The Meaning and Implications of Trinity Lutheran, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105,
121 (2017).
162. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: Para-
digm Lost?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y SUP. CT. REV. (manuscript at 4)
(accusing the majority of “deliberately obscur[ing] the constitutional difference
between discrimination against individuals because of their religious identity,
and generically distinctive treatment of all houses of worship”), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3012274 [https://perma.unl.edu/WME2-
QFE6].
163. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
164. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2033–35 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
165. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 162.
166. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 183 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
167. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 727 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. McConnell, supra note 166, at 183.
169. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2033 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
170. Locke, 540 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024.
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for the sole purpose of advancing, those who teach Christianity. Secu-
lar organizations received “comparable . . . assistance.”172 The pro-
gram in Trinity Lutheran is therefore distinct from those criticized by
the founding-era anti-establishmentarians.
When it comes to the historical anti-establishment arguments, this
is not a distinction without a difference.173 Madison argued that com-
pelled support makes religious teachings less persuasive.174 This only
applies, however, when governments fund religion qua religion. Fund-
ing only certain denominations pressures churches to identify a cer-
tain way, ministers to preach a certain way, and churchgoers to attend
a certain place. If a church knows that the government will pay it for
teaching a favored doctrine, then instead of teaching what the church
believes to be true, it may be pressured to teach what the government
prefers. If a religion is widely professed, outsiders may attribute this
to the funding it receives rather than its “innate excellence.”175
These concerns do not attend funding arrangements like the one in
Trinity Lutheran. When a government makes funds generally availa-
ble and does not target certain denominations or dogmas, it removes
the incentive for a church to change its identity or teachings.176
In fact, the funding arrangement preferred by the dissent, which
provides funding only to nonreligious entities, is more like the ar-
rangement Madison criticized, which provided funding only to relig-
ious entities, than the arrangement envisioned by the majority, which
provides funding regardless of religious status. This is because the dis-
sent’s arrangement, like Virginia’s arrangement, puts prospective re-
cipients to a choice between maintaining their sincere religious beliefs
and receiving government support.177 While the Virginia establish-
ment system creates incentives for potential recipients to adopt relig-
ious positions they do not sincerely hold, the dissent’s no-funding
system creates incentives for potential recipients to abandon religious
positions they do sincerely hold. Both results are inconsistent with the
aims of the religion clauses. Only a rule that prevents the government
from singling out religion for special benefits, but requires the govern-
172. McConnell, supra note 166, at 183.
173. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 727–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One can concede the Fram-
ers’ hostility to funding the clergy specifically, but that says nothing about
whether the clergy had to be excluded from benefits the State made available to
all. No one would seriously contend, for example, that the Framers would have
barred ministers from using public roads on their way to church.”).
174. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2033–34 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2033 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting MADISON, supra note 134, at
82–84).
176. In a vacuum, this funding may still provide an incentive for churchgoers to at-
tend a particular church, but this concern is addressed by analyzing the overall
context of government funding in the modern state. See infra note 195 and ac-
companying text.
177. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2021–22.
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ment to include religion in general benefits, can satisfy the religion
clauses. This rule is also more faithful to the historical arguments
against establishment.
Furthermore, the funding in Trinity Lutheran comes in a notably
different context. The role of government has changed dramatically
since the anti-establishmentarians made their case.178 In the estab-
lishment era, governments had not yet begun to “assist a wide range
of charitable and educational activities.”179 In the context of a govern-
ment that funds little, financial support of religion (and the accompa-
nying onerous taxation) could reasonably be seen as a step toward
establishment. But the same funding is much less mischievous in the
“modern welfare-regulatory state” epitomized by higher levels of
spending and taxing across the board.180 This is because:
[w]hen the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit be-
comes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured;
and when the State withholds that benefit from some individuals solely on the
basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had
imposed a special tax.181
Justice Scalia’s “baseline” framing explains why a state does not vio-
late the Establishment Clause when it makes a public benefit availa-
ble to a church. It does not violate the Establishment Clause because
it does not impermissibly “advance[ ] . . . religion.”182 Missouri funds
all sorts of organizations through its resurfacing program.183 To also
fund churches does not “favor,”184 “endorse,”185 or “advance”186 relig-
ion—it merely puts churches on a level playing field with other non-
profit organizations. In other words, it is neutral toward religion. And
neutrality is the “touchstone” of Establishment Clause doctrine.187
The dissent argued Tilton controlled the Establishment ques-
tion.188 Tilton no longer controls. Tilton was decided in 1971, and to-
178. See Laycock, supra note 48, at 147 (arguing that although the principles of “no
funding” and “no discrimination” were consistent at the time of the founding, the
realities of modern government have made them inconsistent today).
179. McConnell, supra note 166, at 183.
180. Id. at 175.
181. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726–27 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quota-
tions omitted) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1997)).
183. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 1.
184. See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Lee v. Weis-
man, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992).
185. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763–65
(1995); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
592 (1989).
186. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1993); Ed-
wards v. Aguillard 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
187. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860.
188. See supra notes 120–123 and accompanying text.
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day’s Court interprets “Establishment” differently.189 Tilton used the
Lemon test to hold that governments could not fund, and therefore
advance, religious activity. The modern Court modified Lemon190 and
narrowed the term “advance” under Lemon to exclude neutral
funding.
Tilton’s rule works for small, but not large governments.191 Small
governments express approval for religion when they tax citizens to
fund churches.192 Large governments do not express approval of relig-
ion when they tax citizens to fund churches. Large governments fund
organizations that promote competing messages.193 Because the
messages conflict, the government does not express approval for a
message by merely funding its promoter. Large governments express
disapproval194 when they tax religious and secular citizens but fund
only secular organizations.195
Though the dissent explains why small governments may not fund
churches,196 it fails to explain why large governments may not fund
churches. Though the dissent explains why governments may not fund
churches designedly,197 it fails to explain why governments may not
fund churches incidentally. Though the dissent understands the relig-
ion clauses, it “fail[s] to recognize the effect of the change in govern-
mental roles.”198 Our governments have changed. They not only fund
more—more interests of more institutions—but also fund those inter-
ests and institutions in a different manner through neutral—not
targeted—funding of a church.
B. Implications for Future Cases
1. School Choice
Trinity Lutheran may have substantial implications for school
choice programs. Observers connected Trinity Lutheran and school
189. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).
190. Id. at 233 (treating the entanglement prong of the Lemon test not as a separate
inquiry but “as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect” and asking
whether the entanglement has “the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion”).
191. A large government is one that more “deeply” regulates “private life” and “the
non-profit sector” and that taxes citizens more heavily to provide public benefits.
See McConnell, supra note 166, at 181, 183.
192. See id. at 184.
193. See id. at 183.
194. The Establishment Clause also forbids a government from expressing disap-
proval of religion. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (collecting cases).
195. See Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 375, 390 (1990).
196. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2033–35 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
197. See id.
198. McConnell, supra note 166, at 184.
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choice when the case was decided;199 after the decision, scholars have
argued that Trinity Lutheran will require states with private school
voucher programs to include private religious schools in those pro-
grams.200 This does logically follow from the majority’s reasoning in
Trinity Lutheran.
Trinity Lutheran forbids states from distributing generally availa-
ble public benefits in a way that discriminates on the basis of relig-
ion.201 A voucher program is no less a generally available public
benefit than a playground resurfacing program.202 In fact, given the
competitive and selective nature of the benefit in Trinity Lutheran, a
voucher program might be even more generally available. When a
state makes vouchers available for private secular schools but not for
private religious schools, it discriminates on the basis of religion by
excluding otherwise-eligible recipients from a benefit on the basis of
their religious status.203 Thus, if a state is to provide school choice
benefits to private secular schools but not to private religious schools,
it will need to pass strict scrutiny.
It is unlikely that such a program would pass strict scrutiny. On
this point, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris204 interacts with Trinity Lu-
theran in an important way. In Zelman, the Court upheld a voucher
program that included private religious schools against an Establish-
ment Clause challenge.205 Thus, states may include religious schools
in voucher programs without violating the federal Establishment
Clause.206 Under Trinity Lutheran, a state’s decision not to fund relig-
ion is a mere “policy preference”—not a compelling interest—when
the funding would be permissible under the federal Establishment
Clause, unless it is as strong and historically-rooted as the interest in
Locke.207
199. Valerie Strauss, Will the Supreme Court’s Trinity Decision Lead to the Spread of
School Voucher Programs?, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/06/26/will-the-supreme-courts-trinity-deci
sion-lead-to-the-spread-of-school-voucher-programs/?utm_term=.515dac7b2493
[https://perma.unl.edu/DZ4H-L45E].
200. William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, Odious to the Constitution: The Educational
Implications of Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 346 ED. L. REP. 1, 12 (2017).
201. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021
(2017).
202. See Garnett & Blais, supra note 161, at 123 (“As Justice Breyer noted in his con-
curring opinion, ‘[p]ublic benefits come in many shapes and sizes,’ including
school vouchers.”) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
203. Id.
204. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
205. Id. at 645, 662–63.
206. Thro & Russo, supra note 200, at 12.
207. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024
(2017).
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The Supreme Court itself apparently recognized the potential con-
nection between Trinity Lutheran and school choice programs; when
the Court decided Trinity Lutheran, it also vacated the judgments of
two decisions upholding discrimination in private school vouchers,208
and ordered reconsideration of those cases in light of Trinity
Lutheran.209
The Executive Branch has also argued that some school choice pro-
grams are unconstitutional after Trinity Lutheran. Four months after
Trinity Lutheran, the Attorney General issued a memorandum to
guide agencies and departments on principles of religious liberty.210
The memorandum relied on Trinity Lutheran and prohibited govern-
ment actors from excluding religious schools from voucher
programs.211
Following the memorandum, the Department of Justice filed an
amicus brief challenging a Montana school choice program.212 Mon-
tana’s program uses tax credits to reimburse taxpayers who donate to
“Student Scholarship Organizations.”213 Montana excludes religious
schools from the program.214 The Department of Justice argued that
this exclusion violated the First Amendment under Trinity
Lutheran.215
The possibility that Trinity Lutheran may make states include re-
ligious schools in their school choice programs has led even those who
would otherwise welcome Trinity Lutheran to be wary.216 If a court
208. See Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017);
N.M. Ass’n of Non-Public Sch. v. Moses, 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
209. Thro & Russo, supra note 200, at 12.
210. See Memorandum from the Attorney General, Federal Law Protections for Relig-
ious Liberty 1 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1001891/download [https://perma.unl.edu/AMN8-UACE].
211. Id. at 2–3.
212. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of
Revenue, No. DA 17-0492 (Mont. Jan. 18, 2018).
213. Megan Eckstein, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue: Tax Credits, Re-
ligious Schools, and Constitutional Conflict, 79 MONT. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 15
(2018), https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr_online/vol79/iss1/3 [https://perma
.unl.edu/5XHP-UTWM] (“Taxpayers use the program as follows: first, a taxpayer
makes a charitable donation to a Student Scholarship Organization (SSO). The
program then allows the taxpayer to claim a tax credit for up to $150 on their tax
return. Next, a parent or guardian who wants to send their child to a qualified
education provider selects the school of their choice. Finally, the SSO delivers the
scholarship funds directly to the chosen school.”).
214. Id. at 16.
215. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 212, at 11–16.
216. Frank Ravitch, Symposium: Trinity Lutheran and Zelman – Saved by Footnote 3
or a Dream Come True for Voucher Advocates?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017,
10:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-trinity-lutheran-
church-v-comer-zelman-v-simmons-harris-saved-footnote-3-dream-come-true-
voucher-advocates/ [https://perma.unl.edu/338N-N944] (“Quite honestly, if it
were not for Zelman I would welcome the decision in Trinity Lutheran.”).
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mandates including private religious schools in these programs, it
may create a system where parents who would otherwise prefer not to
send their children to religious schools have no choice but to do so.217
A system like this arguably existed in Zelman, where the public school
system was failing and where nearly all recipients of the private
school vouchers were religious.218 The only good secular options for
parents were the magnet or charter schools, but those were not availa-
ble to all students as they were gated through a lottery system.219 The
system functionally forced lottery losers to choose between giving
their children an inadequate education or a religious one. Further-
more, a voucher system can hurt the public schools by draining funds
from those schools. This makes the system more coercive over time as
the increasing diversion of funds leads to poorer education, which
pushes more parents to choose the voucher system, which diverts
more funds220 —and the cycle continues.
On the other hand, so long as there are adequate secular options
(either a strong public school system or plentiful secular private
schools), the inclusion of private religious schools in this public benefit
system is probably the right outcome. The same concerns that lead
one to criticize a situation like Zelman’s—where the only practical
choice for most families is religious schooling—should lead one to criti-
cize a situation where the only practical choice for most families is
secular schooling. Just as the parents who would rather their children
not attend religious schools are pressured to do so in a situation like
Zelman’s, parents who would rather their children not attend secular
schools are similarly pressured when the government—after taxing
both secular parents and religious parents—distributes vouchers only
to secular schools.
2. FEMA Funds
An area where Trinity Lutheran has already had an effect is in the
distribution of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
funds. FEMA formerly refused to fund houses of worship.221 In the
aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, several Texas churches sought assis-
tance from FEMA to repair their buildings, but FEMA’s policy of cate-
gorically excluding churches made them ineligible.222 The churches
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Emma Green, Will Trump Direct FEMA to Fund Churches Hit by Hurricanes?,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/
hurricane-harvey-faith-based-organizations-fema-trump/539346/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/SL6D-XZ9C].
222. Justin Wm. Moyer, Trump Tweets Support for Texas Churches Seeking FEMA
Money After Harvey; Lawsuits Already Filed, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://
2018] TRINITY LUTHERAN V. COMER 549
sued, claiming that FEMA’s policy violated the Free Exercise Clause
under Trinity Lutheran’s rule.223 In January 2018, FEMA announced
that it would no longer exclude churches224 and the parties agreed to
dismiss the case.225
If the case had not been dismissed, the correct outcome under Trin-
ity Lutheran would have been to strike down FEMA’s policy. Again,
the rule from Trinity Lutheran states that governments may not ex-
clude a potential recipient from receiving a generally available public
benefit on the basis of religion without passing strict scrutiny.226
FEMA funds are a public benefit.227 Although they are only available
to some citizens at some times, they are at least as generally available
as the benefit in Trinity Lutheran, which was limited and competitive.
FEMA’s policy discriminated on the basis of religion: its policy of cate-
gorically preventing churches from receiving funds is analogous to the
Missouri policy struck down in Trinity Lutheran.
Thus, the federal government would need to show that FEMA’s ex-
clusionary policy was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling inter-
est in order to survive the churches’ challenge. But the policy achieves
no government interest aside from the anti-establishment interest. In
fact, the exclusion of churches was “particularly irrational” because
FEMA relied on churches to achieve its post-disaster goals.228 This
also suggests that the anti-establishment interest was not compelling
because it showed that FEMA’s policy was underinclusive.229 If sepa-
ration of church and state in disaster relief were a compelling interest,
FEMA would not undermine that interest by working with and
through churches.
Even so, when the District Court denied a motion for a preliminary
injunction filed by the churches, it held that the churches were likely
to fail on the merits because FEMA discriminated on religious use, not
www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/09/07/texas-churches-dam
aged-during-harvey-sue-fema-for-federal-funding-denied-houses-of-worship/?utm
_term=.eec40f841f41 [https://perma.unl.edu/MMB2-DTH3].
223. Complaint at 1, Harvest Family Church v. FEMA, No. CV H-17-2662, 2017 WL
6060107 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2017), order vacated, appeal dismissed, No. 17-20768,
2018 WL 386192 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2018).
224. Michelle Boorstein, In a Shift, Trump Administration Says Houses of Worship
Can Apply for FEMA Funding for Hurricane Harvey Relief, WASH. POST (Jan. 9,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/01/04/in-a-
shift-trump-administration-says-houses-of-worship-can-get-direct-fema-funding-
after-disasters/?utm_term=.da2c5326f960 [https://perma.unl.edu/RL2S-6ZDP].
225. Harvest Family Church, 2018 WL 386192, at *1.
226. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021
(2017).
227. See McWaters v. FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 826 (E.D. La. 2006).
228. Complaint, supra note 223, at 11.
229. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
543–47 (1993).
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status.230 The majority in Trinity Lutheran emphasized religious “sta-
tus” when analyzing Missouri’s discrimination.231 It reasoned that re-
ligious status and identity receive more constitutional protection from
discrimination than religious use. For instance, in the contentious
footnote 3, the majority said that the decision addressed “religious
identity,” not “religious uses,”232 and the Court said that Locke did not
control because Locke permitted states to discriminate in funding on
the basis of religious use, while Missouri’s program discriminated in
funding on religious status.233
The District Court cited the status–use distinction and footnote 3
to justify a narrow reading of Trinity Lutheran and a broad reading of
Locke.234 This illustrates an early trend. Other courts have similarly
used the Court’s language to narrow Trinity Lutheran.235 If the sta-
tus–use distinction prevails, then many policies like FEMA’s—ad-
dressing use, not status—may survive constitutional challenges.
C. The Majority’s Status–Use Distinction Is Incorrect
The remainder of this Note argues that Justice Gorsuch’s concur-
ring opinion is correct and the majority’s status–use distinction should
not be retained.
1. The Status–Use Distinction Is Inconsistent with Supreme
Court Precedent
The Court’s status–use distinction is not supported by Free Exer-
cise jurisprudence and is inconsistent with the cases on which the ma-
jority relied for its holding. The majority cited McDaniel frequently
230. Harvest Family Church v. FEMA, No. CV H-17-2662, 2017 WL 6060107, at *3–5
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2017), order vacated, appeal dismissed, No. 17-20768, 2018 WL
386192 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2018). FEMA’s policy excluded churches because they
were used for religious activities, not because they were owned by religious insti-
tutions. Complaint, supra note 223, at 9 (quoting FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY, FP 104-009-2, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE (Apr.
2017), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1496435662672-d79ba9e1edb1
6e60b51634af00f490ae/2017_PAPPG_2.0_508_FINAL(2).pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/N9YM-JU2Z]).
231. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019–22.
232. Id. at 2024 n.3.
233. Id. at 2022–24 (“Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he
was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use the funds to
prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that Trinity Lutheran was
denied a grant simply because of what it is—a church.”).
234. Harvest Family Church, 2017 WL 6060107, at *3–4.
235. See, e.g., Ill. Bible Colls. Ass’n v. Anderson, 870 F.3d 631, 640 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024); Freedom from Religion Found. v.
Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 181 A.3d 992, 1010 (N.J. 2018) (same);
Taylor v. Town of Cabot, No. 2016-276, 2017 WL 4454708, at *7 ¶27 (Vt. Oct. 6,
2017) (same).
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and considered it analogous to Trinity Lutheran.236 When the Court
quoted McDaniel, however, it misleadingly made McDaniel appear to
be concerned only with discrimination against status and unconcerned
with discrimination against conduct or use.237
For instance, the Court used the following quote from McDaniel :
“to condition the availability of benefits . . . upon [a recipient’s] will-
ingness to . . . surrender[ ] his religiously impelled [status] effectively
penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional liberties.”238 However,
the McDaniel Court’s original statement made clear that it was con-
cerned with conduct: “[T]o condition the availability of benefits [in-
cluding access to the ballot] upon this appellant’s willingness to
violate a cardinal principle of [his] religious faith [by surrendering his
religiously impelled ministry] effectively penalizes the free exercise of
[his] constitutional liberties.”239 Thus, the McDaniel Court found it
impermissible to condition a benefit on protected conduct; the govern-
ment cannot force one to violate the principles of one’s faith or to aban-
don the work of ministry.
This was made even more clear by the McDaniel Court’s discus-
sion. The specific liberties that Tennessee penalized were, “the right to
preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions” all
verbs which the Free Exercise Clause “unquestionably encom-
passes.”240 The McDaniel Court did describe Tennessee’s law as im-
permissibly disqualifying McDaniel based on his “status as a
‘minister,’”241 but only an unfaithful reading of McDaniel construes
this statement as dealing “solely”242 with status as the Trinity Lu-
theran majority did. “Status” in this situation was defined by state law
“in terms of conduct.”243 Moreover, the Court itself classified “minis-
ter” through the protected actions of “preach[ing], proselyt[ing], and
perform[ing].”244
The McDaniel Court did not divide between status and use, giving
full protection to status and withholding full protection from use. In-
stead, it divided between “freedom to believe,” which receives absolute
protection, and “freedom to act,” which can be “overbalanced” only by
“interests of the highest order . . . not otherwise served,” and which
236. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019–24.
237. See id. at 2020–22.
238. Id. at 2022 (alterations by Trinity Lutheran court) (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618, 626 (1978)).
239. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (alterations by McDaniel court) (quoting Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
240. Id. at 625–26.
241. Id. at 627 (quoted in Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2020).
242. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2020.
243. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627.
244. Id. at 626.
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includes both religious status and religious conduct or use.245 Thus, a
faithful reading of McDaniel—a case on which the Court so heavily
relies and yet so obviously misconstrues in this regard—sees status
and use as deserving—and receiving—identical protection, namely,
the protection of strict scrutiny.
2. The Status–Use Distinction Is Inconsistent with Sound
Discrimination Principles
The majority considers this to be a case about religious discrimina-
tion.246 But the status–use distinction employed by the majority is in-
consistent with the majority’s “paradigm of nondiscrimination”247
because it is out of step with the Court’s nondiscrimination principles.
In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice O’Connor wrote in her concurring
opinion:
Texas argues, however, that the sodomy law does not discriminate against
homosexual persons. Instead, the State maintains that the law discriminates
only against homosexual conduct. While it is true that the law applies only to
conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated
with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, Texas’ sodomy law is
targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a
class.248
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Court “explicitly em-
braced”249 O’Connor’s approach and relied on it to uphold a law
school’s policy that prevented Registered Student Organizations from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.250 Elsewhere, the
Iowa Supreme Court used the O’Connor approach—conflating status
and conduct—to strike down a prohibition on same-sex marriage as
violative of its state Constitution,251 and to rebut arguments by relig-
ious business owners that they do not violate public accommodation
245. Id. at 627–28, 627 n.5.
246. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 162 (manuscript at 4) (“The paradigm of nondiscrimi-
nation is front and center, and forms the opinion’s emotional pivot. Near the end,
the opinion uses the line “no churches need apply” to describe the workings of the
Missouri scheme. This was factually accurate, but its form is clearly designed to
evoke the invidious discrimination associated with exclusion of members of par-
ticular races, nationalities, or religions from employment opportunity. The Chief
Justice appeals to precisely the same concern about prejudice in the very last
section of the opinion, in which he invokes Maryland’s long-ago exclusion of Jews
from public office.”).
247. Id.
248. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
249. Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children’s Right to Be Queer, 35 CARDOZO L.
REV. 425, 472 (2013).
250. 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010).
251. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009).
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laws when they refuse to serve same-sex weddings.252 The O’Connor
conflation approach recognizes the illusory nature of the status–use
distinction.253 The conflation approach properly “protects identity, not
only in its static dimensions, but through its manifestations.”254
Recognizing the force behind the idea that “when the actions are so
closely related with the status, one cannot discriminate against the
act,”255 some have advocated for its application in areas beyond sexual
orientation. For instance, commentators have adopted O’Connor’s lan-
guage and adapted her reasoning to argue that the status–conduct
conflation approach is appropriate in the contexts of race256 and
gender.257
Justice Gorsuch is right. In the context of religious discrimination
under the Free Exercise Clause, O’Connor’s status–conduct conflation
should govern, not the Trinity Lutheran majority’s status–use distinc-
tion. Religion, like sexual orientation, is “defined in part by conduct
that at once expresses and defines one’s identity and beliefs.”258 Relig-
ious conduct (or use) is also “closely linked to one’s religious iden-
tity.”259 And the Court itself has endorsed the reasoning of the
status–conduct conflation in the context of religion. As Justice Scalia
put it, “a tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.”260
252. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280–81 (Colo. App.
2015); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013).
253. Rosky, supra note 249, at 473.
254. Joseph Landau, “Soft Immutability” and “Imputed Gay Identity”: Recent Develop-
ments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 237, 263 (2005).
255. Joshua Bauers, The Price of Citizenship: An Analysis of Anti-Discrimination
Laws and Religious Freedoms in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 15 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION 588, 608 (2014).
256. Lupe S. Salinas, Linguaphobia, Language Rights and the Right of Privacy, 3
STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 53, 88 (2007) (“While it is true that the [restrictions] apply
only to [the] conduct [of speaking Spanish], the conduct [of speaking Spanish]
targeted by this [restriction] is conduct that is closely correlated with being [La-
tino]. Under such circumstances, [a restriction on speaking Spanish] is targeted
at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward [Latinos] as a class.”).
257. Louise Melling, Will We Sanction Discrimination?: Can “Heterosexuals Only” Be
Among the Signs of Today?, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 248, 256 (2013) (“While
it is true that the [rule] applies only to [a service], the [service] targeted . . . is
closely correlated with being [a woman]. Under such circumstances, [the] law is
targeted at more than [a service]. It is instead directed toward [women] as a
class.”).
258. Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal
Marriage Statutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public Market-
place, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 236, 252 (2010).
259. Id.
260. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Trinity Lutheran is correct. The rule it announces—that govern-
ments may not disqualify otherwise-eligible recipients from public
benefits on the basis of their religious character—tracks the text of
the First Amendment and the Court’s Free Exercise Clause prece-
dents, and it is supported by the Court’s discrimination principles and
a discerning analysis of the modern state.
Less certain are the case’s consequences. Its potential reach is
wide. Today’s governments offer an increasing number of public bene-
fits. Many states have constitutional provisions like Missouri’s that
operate to keep those benefits from flowing to religious institutions.
Some federal programs have similar restrictions. Thus, school choice
programs are but one of a vast array of benefits currently in violation
of a broad reading of Trinity Lutheran’s rule. But while Trinity Lu-
theran’s potential reach is wide, its actual reach may be narrow. Fea-
tures of the case and of the majority opinion offer courts the means to
narrowly interpret the case. Footnote 3, though not part of the Court’s
opinion, has already been used to narrow the case,261 though—as Jus-
tice Gorsuch pointed out—it is a mistake to ignore the broad princi-
ples and rules acknowledged and applied by the Court. The status–use
distinction, if not repudiated, may similarly narrow Trinity Lutheran,
and—ironically—widen Locke, which the Trinity Lutheran Court con-
strued narrowly.262
For the near future, Trinity Lutheran’s impact and legacy will be in
the hands of lower court judges. If the case is to breathe, it will require
the labor of judges who recognize and defend the case’s animating
principles and who refuse to dismiss the case by simply invoking foot-
note 3. When the question of the scope of Trinity Lutheran comes
before the Supreme Court, the answer will depend on the realignment
of the seven-Justice coalition from Trinity Lutheran. When “another
day” comes, Justice Breyer—who emphasized the narrow nature of
the benefit in Trinity Lutheran—is the most likely defector. For fore-
casting purposes, Justice Kagan’s joining the majority in full is note-
worthy, as it suggests the case’s reading of precedent and its
reasoning have the support of six Justices. As for the status–use dis-
tinction, it remains to be seen whether—when the distinction deter-
mines the outcome of a case—Justices Gorsuch and Thomas can
persuade three other Justices to abandon the distinction.
261. See Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 361 n.29
(3d Cir. 2017) (interpreting footnote 3 as “[s]ignaling [the Court’s] intent to con-
fine its holding to the particular facts and issue before it”).
262. See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text.
